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1 Introduction
Adverse selection is an important feature of financial markets. Recently, substantial
progress has been made to understand dynamic adverse selection and study adverse selection
in richer environments1. The general finding of this research is that, unlike in the classic
Akerlof (1970) model, trade does not necessarily break down. Owners of higher quality
assets can signal the quality by accepting either a lower probability of trade (Chang (2011),
Guerrieri and Shimer (2014)) or longer waiting times (Daley and Green (2012), Fuchs and
Skrzypacz (2014)) in return for higher prices. While the possibility to signal higher asset
quality allows for all assets to be eventually traded, trade is inefficiently delayed.
The markets that involve dynamic adverse selection commonly share two important fea-
tures that have not been explored in the literature. First, the quality of assets that enter
the market is endogenous and is affected by the evolution of beliefs. Consider, for example,
a market for early stage financing of high-growth firms, provided by venture capital (VC)
or angel investors. When deciding whether to pursue an innovative idea, a potential en-
trepreneur evaluates the private cost of quitting a job or dropping out of college against a
potential benefit of working on a startup. This decision is strongly influenced by the prevail-
ing prices in the market for venture and angel capital, as well as the time it takes to raise the
funds. The potential entrepreneur enters the market for funding after observing how “hot”
the market is. In other words, the decision to enter the funding market is strategic and
depends not only on the quality of the idea but also on current market conditions. These
strategic decisions affect the average project quality in the market and cause a feedback loop
leading to adjustments in prices and incentives to signal quality.
Second, the markets are characterized by the time variation of market conditions. In
early stage financing, the cost of VC funding varies over time for reasons unrelated to the
supply of innovative ideas. Gompers and Lerner (2000) and Diller and Kaserer (2009) show
that higher capital inflows to the VC industry raise valuations of young ventures regardless
of their quality, lowering the cost of funding for entrepreneurs. Varying market conditions
create an option for entrepreneurs to optimally time their fund-raising.
In this paper, I incorporate these two features in a model of dynamic adverse selection
and explore how endogenous entry and time-varying market conditions impact equilibrium
market dynamics. In the context of early stage financing, I analyze the dynamics of the
1See for example Eisfeldt (2004), Chari, Shourideh and Zetlin-Jones (2010), Tirole (2012), Kurlat (2013);
Guerrieri and Shimer (2014), Daley and Green (Forthcoming), Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2014), Strebulaev, Zhu
and Zryumov (2014).
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average quality of projects receiving funding, resulting patterns in deal volume, and the
overall market efficiency. I build a dynamic model of adverse selection in which entrepreneurs,
who are privately informed about the quality of their ideas, enter the market over time and
attempt to raise funds from uninformed investors. The variation in market conditions is
driven by investors’ cost of capital, modeled as a discount rate. Investors’ discount rate
ultimately affects gains from trade and incentives of entrepreneurs to raise funds and enter
the market.
Although I use the market for early stage financing as a motivating example, the economic
mechanism I examine is quite general. It can manifest itself in multiple markets, in which
conditions vary over time and adverse selection plays an important role, such as private
equity and IPO markets, among others.
My first key result demonstrates the dynamics of the equilibrium volume of deals. In
particular, I find that an improvement in market conditions triggers a wave of deals. The
wave is driven by a combination of two factors: accumulation of unfunded projects in the
market and subsequent deterioration of incentives to delay fund-raising. Low liquidity, when
discount rates are high, is caused by entrepreneurs with good projects who signal their type
and attempt to raise funds at higher valuations with a delay. The delay results in a buildup
of inventory over time. When the discount rate falls, unfunded entrepreneurs with good
projects rush to the market for two reasons. First, the option value of waiting for a lower
discount rate disappears. Second, high valuations attract worse projects to the market,
which contaminates the pool. Strict preference for immediate trade results in abundance of
fund-raising activity.
In contrast to Pa´stor and Veronesi (2005) and Bustamante (2012), I find that delaying
fund-raising results in high average quality of projects being funded at the beginning of the
wave (even when compared to raising funds in a “cold” market). This is a consequence of
the wave being driven by the incentives of high-quality entrepreneurs. Thus, the “quantity
adjustment” (Ritter and Welch (2002)) in my model comes from the top rather than from
the bottom of the quality distribution.
My second key result demonstrates the variation in the equilibrium quality of funded
projects. I show that during good times, when the supply of capital is high and the discount
rate of investors is correspondingly low, entrepreneurs raise funds immediately upon entry.
However, and perhaps surprisingly, the average quality of funded projects is relatively low.
Conversely, during bad times, when the discount rate of investors is high, the number of low
quality entrepreneurs entering the market is low, and the average quality of projects in the
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market is relatively high. Raising funds, however, takes longer on average.
An apparent mismatch between the time it takes to raise funds and the quality of projects
in the market is resolved via the following intuition. When investors’ discount rate is low,
project valuations are high regardless of quality. This reduces the desire of entrepreneurs with
good projects to signal their type, implying shorter fund-raising times. At the same time,
ease of obtaining funds and high valuations attract a lot of entrepreneurs with low quality
projects resulting in the low average quality. High discount rates increase sensitivity of
entrepreneurs with good projects to underpricing. This observation, in combination with an
option to wait for a lower discount rate, renders low price offers during bad times unattractive.
In order to raise funds at higher valuations, entrepreneurs with good projects opt to delay
fund-raising. This makes a high pooling price less attractive to entrepreneurs with bad
projects and incentivizes some to reduce the waiting time by raising funds at low separating
valuations. A resulting increase of the quality of the pool allows investors to offer higher
pooling prices in the first place. Difficulty of raising funds and low valuations conditional
on the project type reduce entry of entrepreneurs with bad projects and, thus, improve the
average quality of projects receiving financing.
Another key result is that illiquidity can be both a source of and a remedy for inefficiency.
On the one hand, high liquidity is desirable, because positive net present value (NPV)
projects are funded quickly and no value is lost due to time discounting. On the other hand,
when funding is raised quickly, prices reflect average (pooling) project quality and fail to
reveal private information. The pooling price is an effective subsidy to the entrepreneurs
with bad projects. It distorts incentives to enter the market and results in negative NPV
projects obtaining funding. Efficient incentives to enter are restored when the discount
rate of investors is high. Delay allows investors to partially screen the projects by type.
Specifically, equilibrium pay-off to the entrepreneur with a bad project fully reveals her
private information, resulting in only positive NPV projects being funded in equilibrium.
My model naturally lends itself to several empirical implications. First, the results
demonstrate that volume of deals is positively correlated with gains from trade. Lower
gains from trade caused by, for example, a higher cost of investors’ capital cause a price
adjustment, as well as a quantity adjustment. These outcomes are broadly consistent with
the findings by Gompers and Lerner (2000) for venture capital and by Axelson, Jenkinson,
Stro¨mberg and Weisbach (2009) for private equity buyouts. My model is also predictive of a
wave of deals, which is a definitive feature of the IPO (Ritter and Welch (2002)) and private
equity buyout (Kaplan and Stein (1993)) markets.
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Second, the results show that quality of the projects receiving funding is non-monotone
with respect to the deal volume and the supply of capital, proxied by investors’ discount
rate. The quality is at its lowest when the discount rate has been low for a prolonged
period of time; it is higher when discount rates are high, and it is the highest early in the
fund-raising wave. Empirically, this has been generally supported in several markets. In the
context of IPOs, Ritter and Welch (2002) write that “it is conventional wisdom among both
academics and practitioners that the quality of firms going public deteriorates as a period
of high issuing volume progresses.” This is consistent with my findings and is empirically
confirmed by Chang, Kim and Shim (2013), who show that firms going public early in hot
markets are of higher quality than firms going public later. Similarly, Kaplan and Stein
(1993) document that transactions completed in the late 1980’s (following a long period of
cheap access to debt) were of poorer quality: among the largest buyouts, roughly every third
resulted in some form of financial distress with every fourth actually defaulting on debt and
filing for Chapter 11.
Lastly, the results demonstrate that fund-raising takes more time when investors’ discount
rate is high. Moreover, startups that raise funds with a delay receive a better price and are
on average of higher quality. This prediction is harder to test empirically, since the time
when entrepreneur or firm first enters the market for funding is difficult to observe. For
younger firms, however, this naturally leads to implications about the firm’s age at the time
of receiving financing. For example, one could test whether the age of startups raising Series
A (the first round of VC investment) covaries over time with VC fund flows. Specifically, one
could test whether older startups are more likely to raise Series A round when VC funding
is scarce, and whether they are of higher quality and secure better terms.
1.1 Related Literature
IPO Waves. IPO waves have attracted a lot of attention both in empirical and theoretical
literature (e.g. Alti (2005), Pa´stor and Veronesi (2005), Yung, C¸olak and Wei (2008) Busta-
mante (2012)). The underlying economic mechanism for the occurrence of the “wave” in my
model is very different from what has been reported in the literature. Pa´stor and Veronesi
(2005) and Bustamante (2012) use the real option framework to explain IPO waves. In
both models, entrepreneurs withdraw from the market when market conditions decline due
to the option of waiting and issuing at better terms later. In these papers, deteriorating
market conditions prevent entrepreneurs, ceteris paribus, with worse projects from issuing.
Yung, C¸olak and Wei (2008) consider a static model of adverse selection. They find that a
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decrease in gains from trade also affects the volume of deals through the lower part of the
distribution. In contrast, quantity adjustment in my model is driven by entrepreneurs with
better projects withdrawing from the market when conditions (gains from trade) deteriorate,
and accelerating fund-raising when market conditions improve. The distinctive feature of
my model is the initial increase of the average project quality at the beginning of the wave.
Dynamic Markets for Lemons. My paper contributes to theoretical literature on dy-
namic markets for lemons. In particular, I follow the line of Swinkels (1999), Daley and
Green (2012) and Strebulaev, Zhu and Zryumov (2014) by assuming that investors do not
observe previous offers received by entrepreneurs (private offers assumption). Unlike Swinkels
(1999), who solves a model in which the lemons condition is not binding, and Daley and
Green (2012) and Strebulaev, Zhu and Zryumov (2014), who focus on slow revelation of
information, I primarily investigate the interaction between variation in gains from trade
and the endogenous quality of entry.
The differences between models with private and public offers have been studied by
Horner and Vieille (2009) and Fuchs, O¨ry and Skrzypacz (2014). In my model, private offers
play a crucial role: they do not allow for a complete separation of entrepreneurs with good
and bad projects. This leads to cross-subsidization in equilibrium. Cross-sectional distribu-
tion of the quality of projects affects the degree of cross-subsidization and has a profound
effect on the equilibrium structure. In contrast, in models with public offers, Noldeke and
Van Damme (1990) and Guerrieri, Shimer and Wright (2010) show that equilibrium is dis-
tribution free and features delay or probabilistic trade even when the asset quality has been
inferred to be good.
Similar to Guerrieri, Shimer and Wright (2010), trade in my model can happen at several
prices simultaneously and sellers are rationed at higher prices. However, the set of prices
offered in equilibrium, as well as the expected time to trade at each particular price, depends
on the distribution of the projects in the market and expectations about future evolution of
gains from trade and/or quality of entry. In Guerrieri, Shimer and Wright (2010), equilibrium
prices are distribution and expectation free, they depend only on buyers’ valuations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I describe a model with a
constant discount rate of investors and endogenous entry. In section 3, I characterize the
steady state equilibrium of that model. In section 4, I describe a model with a time-varying
discount rate and explore its dynamic properties. In section 5, I evaluate several applications
and discuss the empirical implications of the model. In section 6, I close with concluding
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remarks. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Model Setup
In this section I consider a model with a constant discount rate of investors. This as-
sumption is relaxed in Section 4.
2.1 Lemons Market for Projects
Projects. The model is set up in continuous time. There is a continuum of potential
entrepreneurs indexed by i ∈ I. Each entrepreneur i comes up with an idea of quality
θi ∈ {g, b} at time ti and makes a one-time decision whether to start developing the idea
(entry decision). In case of a positive entry decision, the idea becomes a project and the
entrepreneur loses the “potential” prefix. The project requires investment I for successful
completion which can be raised at any time after ti. Funds are raised from a competitive
market using equity. Both the time of entry ti and the quality of the project θi are the
entrepreneur’s private information. Once investment I is made, the project generates a one-
time payment Xθi (Xg > Xb > 0) with Poisson intensity δX . Prior to investment, information
about the project quality of entrepreneur i becomes public with intensity δ. Entrepreneurs
are risk neutral and discount future payoffs at a rate ρ.
Every moment t ≥ ti since the time of market entry, each entrepreneur receives private
offers from investors.2 If offers are unfavorable, the entrepreneur can wait for a better price
or information revelation. As soon as funds are raised, entrepreneur i leaves the market.
Investors. There is a continuum of competitive and homogeneous risk-neutral investors
who discount future payoffs at rate r ∈ (0, ρ). Thus, an investor’s valuation of a θ quality
project is:
Vθ =
δX
δX + r
Xθ.
2An alternative way (leading to the same equilibrium) to specify the model is similar to Guerrieri, Shimer
and Wright (2010): at each moment in time there is a continuum of open markets indexed by the price
v (offered by investors) and the probability of obtaining funds. Entrepreneur i decides on the minimal
acceptable price vit and participates in all markets with v ≥ vit. Recall that in Guerrieri, Shimer and Wright
(2010) participation is restricted to a single market. Every instant markets clear from the top down (highest
prices to lowest) with entrepreneurs being rationed if the supply of projects exceeds the demand for projects
at a particular price.
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Payoffs. If investor offers to provide capital in return for a share I/v in project i, I will
call v investor’s valuation of project i or, interchangeably, a price offer. If entrepreneur i
decides to accept an offer and raise funds at time t at price v, then her expected discounted
payoff is:
e−ρ(t−t
i) δX
δX + ρ
Xθi
(
1− I
v
)
, (1)
where 1− I
v
is the entrepreneur’s share of the project and e−ρ(t−t
i) is her discount factor. Let
Sθ denote the value of the project of quality θ to an entrepreneur who decides to wait until
full information revelation. When information is revealed, all investors value the project
at Vθ. Since investors are homogeneous and competitive, they will offer financing at zero
expected profit. Thus, an entrepreneur’s payoff upon raising funds is δX
δX+ρ
Xθ
(
1− IδX
δX+r
Xθ
)
.
Taking expectation with respect to the time of information arrival gives:
Sθ =
δ
δ + ρ
δX
δX + ρ
Xθ
(
1− I
δX
δX+r
Xθ
)
. (2)
I assume that regardless of the project’s quality, it is profitable to raise funds conditional on
entry.
Assumption 1. The parameters of the model satisfy:
δX
δX + ρ
Xθ > I θ ∈ {g, b}. (Profitability)
Let Bθ(v) denote the expected payoff to an entrepreneur with a θ quality project raising
funding at a price v immediately upon entry:
Bθ(v) =
δX
δX + ρ
Xθ
(
1− I
v
)
. (3)
2.2 Entry of Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs arrive to the market starting at time 0. I assume that the supply of
entrepreneurs with bad projects is more sensitive to the market conditions than the supply
of good projects. In particular, I make the following simplifying assumption: potential
entrepreneurs with good ideas always enter the market as soon as they have an idea. Without
loss of generality, I can normalize the rate of entry of entrepreneurs with good projects to 1dt
(i.e., at time t the total number of entrepreneurs with good projects who enter the market
8
dt
Investors make
private offers
Entrepreneurs
accept or reject
Information
is released
New entre-
preneurs enter
Investors make
private offers
Figure 1: Sequence of events during interval dt
is t).
Entrepreneurs with bad projects are strategic about the entry decision. Their entry is
affected by the valuations prevalent in the market and the ease of obtaining funding. Every
potential entrepreneur i with quality θi = b at time ti weighs the benefits from entering
the market against a private cost ci. The private cost can be interpreted broadly as an
opportunity cost of engaging in some other activity (e.g., the cost of quitting a job or
dropping out of college). Denote by G(c) the measure3 of entrepreneurs with bad projects
having private cost no greater than c. I assume that G(·) is continuous, strictly increasing
with G(0) = 0 and G(∞) = ∞. Denote by ct the highest private cost of a potential
entrepreneur with a bad idea willing to enter the market at time t, then G(ct)dt is the rate
of entry of entrepreneurs with bad projects at time t.
2.3 Strategies
Investors. Instead of defining investors’ information sets, strategies, and payoffs, I model
them as a collection of stochastic processes V = (V i)i∈I with each V i = (V it )t≥0. V
i
t denotes
the highest valuation of entrepreneur’s i project at time t conditional on information about
project i not being released yet.4 The stochastic component in the definition of the price
process is needed to allow investors to play mixed strategies, which will be crucial for equilib-
rium construction. The class of processes that I consider (see Definition 4 in the Appendix)
allows for playing a pure strategy, mixing between different prices with positive probabilities,
and between prices with positive rates.5
To reflect the information available to investors, I impose restrictions on the price pro-
cesses in Assumption 2.
3For a precise definition of the index set I, distribution of private costs ci, and distribution of potential
entry times ti see Appendix A.
4Recall that when information about the project quality is released, the project is priced at δXδX+rXθi and
the entrepreneur raises funds immediately.
5The latter strategy, for example, could be used for offering high prices with an exponential delay, similar
to arrival of jumps in a Poisson process.
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Assumption 2. The collection of price offers V = (V i)i∈I satisfies:
1. Private Offers:
{V is ; s < t} is independent from {V is ; s ≥ t} ∀ i ∈ I, t ≥ ti.
2. Anonymity:
{V i}i∈I are pairwise i.i.d.
Part 1 of Assumption 2 captures the notion that investors do not observe previous offers
received by entrepreneur i. Therefore, they cannot condition their current and future offers
on that information. Part 2 implies that investors cannot condition their offers on the identity
of the entrepreneur (recall that ti is entrepreneur’s private information). It also allows me
to use the exact law of large numbers in the cross-section of entrepreneurs (i.e., if investors
mix between valuations v1 and v2 with equal probability then exactly half the population of
entrepreneurs will be offered v1 with the other half being offered v2).
6 It is useful to denote
the set of all offered valuations at time t as Vt = supp(V it ).
Entrepreneurs. At time t, potential entrepreneurs with bad ideas and ti = t face an entry
decision, which is captured by ct — the highest private cost of entrepreneur who is willing
to enter at time t. Conditional on entry, each entrepreneur i observes all previously received
offers. Hence, her private history is Hit = {V iu ; ti ≤ u ≤ t}. In order to allow for mixing, I
define entrepreneur’s strategy F i as a non-decreasing ca´dla´g stochastic process F i = (F it )t≥ti
adapted to private history (Hit)t≥ti such that 0 ≤ F it ≤ 1 for all t ≥ ti. Intuitively, F it is a
cumulative probability of entrepreneur i raising funds before or at time t. Every strategy F i
induces a (possibly stochastic) time of trade for entrepreneur i which is denoted by τ i. Let
F = (F i)i∈I denote the strategy profile of all entrepreneurs.
2.4 Market Belief
Since investors do not observe either the quality of the projects they are evaluating or
the time any particular entrepreneur has been on the market, they form beliefs based on
aggregate quantities. Denote by mgt (m
b
t) the mass of sellers with good (bad) projects in the
market at time t. Then:
6See Sun (2006) for additional detail.
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mgt ≡ mes
{
i : ti ≤ t ≤ τ i and θi = g} ; (4)
mbt ≡ mes
{
i : ti ≤ t ≤ τ i and θi = b and ci ≤ cti
}
. (5)
Let pit denote the average aggregate quality of assets in the market at time t, then:
7,8
pit =

mgt−
mgt− +mbt−
, if mgt− +m
b
t− > 0,
1
1+G(ct)
, if mgt− +m
b
t− = 0.
(6)
Although I do not model the matching of investors and entrepreneurs explicitly, one can
think of investors meeting a random entrepreneur every period t with every entrepreneur
meeting at least two investors. If there are currently mgt− entrepreneurs with good projects
in the market and mbt− entrepreneurs with bad projects in the market, then the chances that
a randomly picked entrepreneur has a good project is mgt−/(m
g
t− + m
b
t−). If, however, all
the projects in the past have already received funding (mgt− + m
b
t− = 0), then the quality
of a randomly picked project in the market equals the average quality of the new projects
entering the market, 1/(1 +G(ct)).
2.5 Equilibrium
Every entrepreneur i entering the market at time ti maximizes
sup
F i
E
[
Sθi +
∫ ∞
ti
e−(ρ+δ)(τ−t
i)(Bθi(V
i
τ )− Sθi)dF iτ
]
. (7)
One can think of the expected value of investment post information arrival Sθi as an outside
option that an entrepreneur is endowed with at date ti. If funds are raised at valuation V iτ at
time τ , then she receives the value Bθi(V
i
τ ) but loses the option Sθi . This payoff is discounted
by e−ρ(τ−t
i) due the entrepreneur’s time preferences and by e−δ(τ−t
i) due to the possibility of
information arrival before time τ . Finally, the expectation is taken over all times τ , which
have a cumulative distribution function, F i.
For t ≥ ti, denote by W it entrepreneur i’s continuation value conditional on the observed
7As usual, mθt− stands for the left limit of m
θ at time t (i.e., mθt− ≡ lims↑tmθs).
8The second part of equation (6) requires conditioning on measure zero set in I. Such conditional
expectation is well defined due to Radon-Nikodym.
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private history Hit and the fact that she has not raised funds yet:
W it = sup
F i
E
[
Sθi +
∫ ∞
t
e−(ρ+δ)(τ−t)(Bθi(V
i
τ )− Sθi)dF iτ
∣∣∣Hit, τ i > t] . (8)
Define two auxiliary processes:
W gt = sup
i: ti≤t, F it−<1, θi=g
W it and W
b
t = inf
i: ti≤t, F it−<1, θi=b
W it . (9)
W gt (W
b
t ) is the highest (lowest) continuation value of all entrepreneurs with good (bad)
projects who are present in the market at time t with positive probability.
Definition 1. An equilibrium is a quadruple (F, V,mg,mb) with induced continuation values
(W gt ,W
b
t ) that satisfy:
1. Seller Optimality: Given V i, F i solves entrepreneur’s problem (7) for all i and t ≥ ti.
The entry cut-off is given by:
ct = W
b
t . (10)
2. Buyer Optimality:
(a) Zero Profit: For any valuation v ∈ Vt offered at time t, either there does not exist
i such that τ i = t and V it = v, or
v =
δX
δX + r
E
(
Xθi
∣∣∣V it = v, τ i = t). (11)
(b) Market Clearing:9
W gt ≥ Bg
(
δX
δX + r
(pitXg + (1− pit)Xb)
)
and W bt ≥ Bb
(
δX
δX + r
Xb
)
. (12)
3. Belief Consistency: Investors’ beliefs about the proportion of good quality projects in the
market is consistent with mg and mb induced by the entry of new projects (characterized
by the entry cut-off ct) and fund raising decisions induced by the entrepreneurs’ strategy
F and offered prices V .
9This condition prevents the existence of out-of-equilibrium price offers that would yield positive profits
to investors. It is similar to the no deals restriction of Daley and Green (2012) and the market clearing
restriction of Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2014).
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The first part of the market clearing condition states that the (highest) expected con-
tinuation value of an entrepreneur with a good project should be greater or equal than the
average quality of all the projects in the market. If at some point expected continuation
value falls below the average quality of projects in the market, any investor could make
profit by picking a random project and offering a valuation slightly below the market av-
erage. Similarly, if (the lowest) continuation value of the entrepreneur with a bad project
falls below Bb
(
δX
δX+r
Xb
)
, then a price offer δX
δX+r
Xb − ε would ensure profits with positive
probability since it would attract entrepreneurs with bad projects.
Remark 1. Although I model an environment with an entrepreneur (firm) raising a fixed
amount of funds by issuing equity, the model is rich enough to incorporate other setups.
Consider, for example, a market in which sellers who are privately informed about the quality
of the assets (such as pools of mortgages or high-yield corporate bonds) sell to uninformed
competitive buyers. Suppose that for (unmodeled) reasons such as liquidity or hedging risks,
the seller’s value of holding the θ quality asset ad infinitum, Sθ, is smaller than the buyer’s
value of holding the asset ad infinitum, Vθ > Sθ. When a seller transacts at time t at price
v, she receives Bθ(v) = v, but loses the future stream of dividends. Her payoff, therefore, is
Sθ + e
−ρt(Bθ(v) − Sθ), similar to (7). That is, the model can be used to describe markets
where buyers offer a fixed amount of money in exchange for an equity share of varying size,
or markets where buyers obtain a fixed asset/equity stake of unknown quality for varying
prices (and hybrid situations as well).
Definition 2. Equilibrium is in steady state if V i is a stationary process for all i ∈ I and
(mgt ,m
b
t) are constant over time.
The next section characterizes the steady state equilibria of the model.
3 Steady State Equilibria
3.1 Preliminary Analysis
Before fully characterizing the steady state, I describe properties of any equilibrium
which greatly simplify the analysis. I begin by showing in Lemma 1 that in any equilibrium
entrepreneurs are using threshold strategies.
Lemma 1. (Threshold Strategies)
There exist two deterministic functions rgt and r
b
t such that any entrepreneur with a θ quality
13
project in the market at time t rejects all offers v < rθt and raises funds with probability 1 if
offered a valuation v > rθt .
The intuition behind Lemma 1 strongly relies on the private offers assumption. Since
investors do not observe previous offers, the continuation value for any entrepreneur does not
depend on the current valuation itself or on her acceptance decision (even when considering
an off-equilibrium deviation). Thus, any valuation strictly higher than the continuation value
triggers acceptance and any valuation strictly lower than continuation value will be rejected.
Furthermore, I demonstrate in Lemma 2 that these two thresholds can be ranked.
Lemma 2. (Skimming Property)
At any time t,
rgt > r
b
t . (13)
Lemma 2 implies that if some price is attractive for the entrepreneur with a good project,
then the price will be accepted with probability 1 by the entrepreneur with a bad project.
Without asymmetric information, the good project is more valuable than the bad one. Hence,
Sθ serves as an option value of delaying investment until information revelation. This option
is less valuable when the project is bad, which creates incentives for the entrepreneur to
accept lower valuations.10
Lemmas 1 and 2 uniquely define an entrepreneur’s best response to any valuation v which
is not equal to rgt or r
b
t . When the valuation is equal to either of the respective thresholds,
an entrepreneur with a corresponding project is indifferent; nevertheless, in any equilibrium
the action of an entrepreneur with a good project is uniquely pinned down by Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. (No mixing at rgt )
An entrepreneur with a good quality project never plays a mixed strategy. In particular, she
accepts all offers with valuations v ≥ rgt .
If an entrepreneur with a good project were mixing at some offer v = rgt , then the average
quality of projects funded at this price would be below the current average quality of projects
in the market. Recall that, on the one hand, rgt equals the expected continuation value of the
entrepreneur with a good project and, on the other hand, investors break even at v. These
two facts together imply that the first part of the market clearing condition is violated.
10Similarly to Kremer and Skrzypacz (2007), in my model single crossing arises not from costs but from
benefits of delay.
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rb(t) rg(t)
v
Nobody raises funds
E. with bad projects
accept funding
E. with any project
accept funding
Figure 2: Fund-raising decisions of entrepreneurs given a valuation v
The optimal behavior of entrepreneurs together with a break-even constraint for investors
puts strong discipline on the equilibrium set of offered valuations. In particular, any valu-
ation v > rgt or v ∈ (rbt , rgt ) would lose money for investors and therefore will not occur in
equilibrium. Price offers that can occur in equilibrium are classified in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. In any equilibrium, any valuation v ∈ Vt offered at time t is either
Pooling Offer v = δX
δX+r
(pitXg + (1− pit)Xb), or
Separating Offer v = δX
δX+r
Xb, or
Losing Offer v < δX
δX+r
Xb.
For any equilibrium in which losing offers are made, one can construct an equilibrium by
replacing all losing offers with a separating offer and adjusting the probability of acceptance
of the separating offer by the entrepreneurs with bad projects. Without loss of generality, I
focus on equilibria in which only pooling and separating offers are made.
3.2 Equilibrium Construction
I construct a steady state equilibrium in two steps. First, I exogenously fix the entry rate
G(c) of entrepreneurs with bad projects to the market and solve for a steady state equilib-
rium. Then, I endogenize the (constant) ct by tying the entry cut-off with the equilibrium
continuation value using condition (10).
In the steady state equilibrium incentives of an entrepreneur with good quality project
to accept a pooling offer are driven by the following comparison:
ρ
δ + ρ
[
δX
δX + r
Xg − I
]
vs.
(1− pit)I(Xg −Xb)
piXg + (1− pi)Xb . (14)
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The left-hand side of expression (14) represents the benefit due to early investment (recall
that the signal about the project quality is revealed with intensity δ), while the right-hand
side stands for the underpricing costs. Underpricing costs are lower when investors’ belief pit
is higher (underpricing completely disappears when pit = 1), when funding need I is lower,
and when Xg −Xb is lower.
Whenever the right-hand side of expression (14) is higher than the left-hand side, en-
trepreneurs with a good project would rather wait for information revelation than raise funds
at the current pooling valuation. Similar to Akerlof (1970), the market for lemons devel-
ops. The dynamic continuation value of entrepreneurs plays a role of the seller’s cost from
Akerlof’s model and precludes trade at the average price.
Denote by pˆi the value of pit that equates the left- and right-hand sides of expression
(14). When the quality of newly arrived projects 1/(1 + G(ct)) is above pˆi, then immediate
acceptance of a pooling offer for the entrepreneurs with good projects is incentive compatible.
However, when 1/(1 +G(ct)) is below pˆi, immediate pooling is not the best response (i.e.,
the lemons condition is binding). It cannot also be true that in equilibrium entrepreneurs
with good projects never raise funds prior to information revelation, for if it were the case,
then all entrepreneurs with bad projects would raise funding at the moment of entry. In an
arbitrarily small amount of time, the investors’ belief about remaining types in the market
would reach pit = 1. The unique continuation equilibrium would then have immediate trade
at the pooling offer, which is strictly higher than the low valuations just a few moments
earlier. It would make it suboptimal for the entrepreneurs with bad projects to raise funds
immediately upon market entry.
The only way entrepreneurs with bad and good projects would be able to raise funds in
equilibrium, when 1/(1+G(ct)) is below pˆi, is through delayed trade at the pooling valuation.
Higher expected time to raise funds at pooling valuation incentivizes some entrepreneurs
with bad projects to accept an always standing low separating offer. This scenario improves
average quality of projects in the market and allows investors to break even when offering a
high pooling valuation.
Denote by α = 1
1+G(c)
the fraction of entrepreneurs with good projects entering the
market. Proposition 1 characterizes the steady state equilibrium for an exogenously fixed α.
Proposition 1.
1. If α > pˆi, then there exists an essentially11 unique steady state equilibrium. Along the
11The equilibrium is unique up to (i) implementation of mixed strategy by a continuum of entrepreneurs
and (ii) measure zero of entrepreneurs following an arbitrary strategy.
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equilibrium path, all projects are funded at pooling (α) valuation upon entry.
2. If α < pˆi, then there exists an essentially unique steady state equilibrium. Along the
equilibrium path:
(a) Good projects raise funds at pooling (pˆi) valuation;
(b) Bad projects raise funds at separating and pooling (pˆi) valuations;
(c) Supply is rationed at the pooling (pˆi) valuation.
3. If α = pˆi, there exists a continuum of steady state equilibria. Along the equilibrium
path, funds are raised at pooling (pˆi) valuations and supply is rationed.
When α < pˆi, funds are raised at pooling and separating valuations at the same time (see
Figure 3). Through mixing on the investor side of the market at each time t, a fraction of
entrepreneurs is offered a pooling valuation that both types accept. However, a vast majority
of the investors offer to invest only at low (separating) valuation. Such an offer is rejected
by entrepreneurs with good projects. Entrepreneurs with bad projects randomize between
acceptance and rejection, with only a flow of bad types accepting, so that investor beliefs
change continuously.
dt
+
M
pi
1
−
pi
1
G
(c
)
Good Projects
Bad Projects
Raise at Pooling ValuationSeparating Offer
Figure 3: Partial Pooling in the Steady State
With a slight abuse of notation, let Bθ(pi) denote the expected value of accepting a
pooling offer for the entrepreneur with a θ quality project when investors’ belief is pi. Then
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equilibrium payoff W b to the same entrepreneur is:
W b(α) =

Bb (α) , if α =
1
1+G(c)
> pˆi;
Bb(0), if α =
1
1+G(c)
< pˆi;
[Bb(0), Bb (pˆi)], if α =
1
1+G(c)
= pˆi.
(15)
At ti, each entrepreneur with a bad project weighs the cost of entry ci and the expected
equilibrium payoff W b. Those with costs below W b choose to enter; hence, the entry rate of
bad projects is G(W b). In order to solve for the steady state equilibrium with endogenous
entry, the actual proportion of high-quality projects needs to coincide with the one expected
by investors. Proposition 2 establishes existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium with
endogenous entry.
Proposition 2. There exits an essentially unique steady state equilibrium. Proportion α∗
of good projects entering the market every period is the unique root of:
1
1 +G(W b(α∗))
= α∗. (16)
Given α∗, the equilibrium outcome is characterized by Proposition 1.
When equilibrium quality of entry α∗ is below pˆi (i.e., the lemons condition is binding),
then equilibrium in the funding market is inefficient. Since the private cost ci is sunk, As-
sumption 1 implies that conditional on entry all the projects should be financed immediately
in the first best. However, in equilibrium it takes time to raise funds and efficiency is lost
due to discounting.
However, illiquidity in the fund-raising market has a second, welfare improving side. De-
layed funding at high prices serves as an imperfect screening mechanism that allows investors
to separate entrepreneurs with good projects from (some) entrepreneurs with bad projects.
Partial sorting of the projects implies that equilibrium payoff to entrepreneurs with bad
projects equals the true value of their idea, thus, their market entry decisions are efficient.12
On the other hand, when α∗ is above pˆi and the equilibrium features immediate pooling,
the entrepreneurs with bad projects get a payoff higher than the true value of their project,
hence, the entry is inefficiently high.
12Since I have assumed that market entry of entrepreneurs with good projects is inelastic, in steady state
the entry is efficient. However, entrepreneurs with good projects do not receive the true value for their
projects. If their rate of entry depended on the expected return, it would be inefficient.
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Figure 4: Steady State Equilibrium With Endogenous Entry
α
1pˆi
1
1+G(W b(α))
1
1+G(Bb(α))
α∗
(a) Equilibrium with pˆi < α∗
α
1pˆi
1
1+G(W b(α))
1
1+G(Bb(α))
α∗
(b) Equilibrium with pˆi > α∗
A combination of observations discussed above leads to the Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. The steady state equilibrium is always inefficient: if α∗ ≤ pˆi, then positive
gains from trade are realized with a delay; if α∗ > pˆi, there is an excessive entry of bad
projects into the market.
3.3 Varying the Discount Rate
In this section I explore how the nature of the steady state equilibrium depends on the
discount rates of investors. Proposition 4 describes the dependence of the fraction α∗ of good
projects entering the market on the discount rate of investors, r.
Proposition 4. The equilibrium fraction α∗ of good projects entering the market in every
period increases with the discount rate of investors, r.
An increase in the discount rate of investors increases the costs of the early financing
of good projects in two ways. First, it leads to a decrease in the differential benefits of
early investment, because the NPV of the projects becomes smaller. Second, it also leads
to an increase in adverse selection costs, because investors demand a higher equity share
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regardless of the project’s quality. Both of these factors increase pˆi. In addition, an increase
in r decreases the payoff to the entrepreneurs with bad projects conditional on pooling,
Bb(pi). A lower payoff conditional on pooling and a decrease in the willingness of owners
of good projects to pool reduces incentives of entrepreneurs with bad projects to enter the
market.
Both, equilibrium quality of entry α∗ and the lemons condition threshold pˆi move in the
same direction when investors’ discount rate r changes. In order to rank them, I propose
Assumption 3.
Assumption 3. Let the parameters of the model satisfy:
(i) ρ
δ+ρ
(
δX
δX+ρ
Xg − I
)
< I
(
Xg
Xb
− 1
)
< ρ
δ+ρ
(Xg − I) ,
(ii) G
(
δX
δX+ρ
Xb − I
)
> 1
pˆi|r=ρ − 1,
where pˆir=ρ is a solution of (14) with r = ρ.
Part (i) of Assumption 3 makes sure that there is enough variation in the gains from
trade between investors and entrepreneurs relative to the adverse selection discount. Part
(ii) of Assumption 3 rules out the case when the distribution of private costs of entry is so
steep that not enough bad projects enter the market to make the lemons condition binding.
Proposition 5 characterizes the structure of the steady state equilibrium for sufficiently high
and low discount rate, r.
Proposition 5. If parameters satisfy Assumption 3, then there exist two thresholds 0 < r <
r < ρ such that
(i) for all r < r steady state equilibrium features α∗ > pˆi,
(ii) for all r > r steady state equilibrium features α∗ < pˆi.
4 Transition Dynamics
I have shown that a lower discount factor of investors increases the incentives for en-
trepreneurs with lower quality projects to enter the market. This activity reduces the av-
erage quality of projects in the market. In this section, I use a dynamic model to explore
how discount rate variation impacts the volume of funded projects, as well as the quality of
projects receiving funding.
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State Process. The dynamics of the discount rate are driven by a publicly observable
Markov switching state process, Y = (Yt)t≥0, which takes two values Yt ∈ {0, 1}. Denote
by λ1 the arrival intensity of state 1 conditional on Yt = 0, and by λ
0 the arrival intensity
of state 0 conditional on Yt = 1. Let the interest rate of investors r(y) satisfy the following
inequality:
0 < r(1) < r < r < r(0) < ρ. (17)
Inequality (17) implies that in the steady state equilibrium, the lemons condition is binding
when Y = 0 and not binding when Y = 1. Intuitively, in state Yt = 1, investors’ capital is
in abundance, thus, it is cheaper to finance. In Yt = 0, capital is scarce and funding is more
costly.
Histories and Strategies. The definitions of strategies and equilibrium from Section 2 need
to be augmented to allow for state contingency. Define the public history as H = (Ht)t≥0,
where Ht is generated by {Yu;u ≤ t}.
The private history of entrepreneur i now includes both the public history as well as
all previously received price offers, i.e., Hit = σ{Ht;V is , s ≤ t}. Similarly to Section 2, en-
trepreneur’s strategy F i is a non-decreasing ca´dla´g stochastic process F i = (F it )t≥ti adapted
to private history (Hit)t≥ti such that 0 ≤ F it ≤ 1 for all t ≥ ti.
The price processes V i are now allowed to depend on the public history, since the state
process is observed by all investors. Private offers and anonymity conditions are easily
adapted to incorporate state dependency by replacing independence with conditional in-
dependence. In particular, a collection of price offers (V i)i∈I satisfies the private offers
restriction if σ{V is ; s < t} is independent from σ{V is ; s ≥ t} conditional on Ht for all i ∈ I
and t ≥ ti; it satisfies the anonymity restriction if {V i}i∈I at i.i.d. conditional on H.
Payoffs. Similarly to Section 2, define an investor’s valuation of a θ quality project
conditional on state Yt = y as:
Vθ(y) = DX(y)Xθ, (18)
where DX(y) is the expected discounted time until the project pay-out conditional on the
current state being y.13 If a type θ entrepreneur raises funds in state Yt = y at valuation v,
then her payoff is:
Bθ(pi; y) =
δX
δX + ρ
Xθ
(
1− I
v
)
. (19)
Let Sθ(y) be the expected payoff to a type θ entrepreneur from obtaining funding upon
13The values DX(y) uniquely solve a linear system (r(y) + δX + λ
1−y)DX(y) = δX + λ1−yDX(1 − y) for
y ∈ {0, 1}.
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information revelation. Sθ(y) can be written as:
Sθ(y) =
δ
δ + ρ
[
p(1, y)Bθ(Vθ; 1) + (1− p(1, y))Bθ(Vθ; 0)
]
, (20)
where p(y′, y) is the probability of state being y′ at the moment of information revelation,
conditional on the current state being y.14 In equilibrium, every entrepreneur i solves an
optimal stopping problem similar to the one in Section 2:
sup
F i
E
[
Sθi(Yti) +
∫ ∞
ti
e−(ρ+δ)(τ−t
i)(Bθ(V
i
τ , Yτ )− Sθi(Yτ ))dF iτ |Hit
]
. (21)
Definition 3 concerns an equilibrium of the model with stochastic discount rate.
Definition 3. An equilibrium with stochastic discount rate is quadruple (F, V,mg,mb) with
induced continuation values (W gt ,W
b
t ) that satisfy:
1. Seller Optimality: Given V i, F i solves entrepreneur’s problem (21) for all i and t ≥ ti.
The entry cut-off is given by:
ct = W
b
t . (22)
2. Buyer Optimality:
(a) Zero Profit: For any valuation v ∈ Vt offered at time t either there does not exist
i such that τ i = t and V it = v, or
v = DX(Yt) · E
(
Xθi
∣∣∣V it = v, τ i = t). (23)
(b) Market Clearing:
W gt ≥ Bg
(
DX(Yt) · (pitXg + (1− pit)Xb)
)
and W bt ≥ Bb
(
DX(Yt) ·Xb
)
. (24)
3. Belief Consistency: Investors’ belief about the proportion of good quality projects in the
market is consistent with mg and mb induced by entry of new projects (characterized by
the entry cut-off ct) and fund-raising decisions induced by the entrepreneurs’ strategy
F and offered prices V .
14Conditional probabilities p(y′, y) are the unique solution of the linear system (r(y) + δ+λ1−y)p(y′, y) =
δ1(y′ = y) + λ1−yp(y′, 1− y) for y′, y ∈ {0, 1}.
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Proposition 6 shows the existence of a dynamic equilibrium when state transitions do not
happen very often.
Proposition 6. For sufficiently small λ1 and λ0 there exists an equilibrium with stochastic
discount rate.
I now characterize the most salient properties of the equilibrium.
4.1 Wave of Deals
Proposition 7 concerns the equilibrium deal volume. I show that a decrease in investors’
discount rate brings in an abundance of fund-raising activity, i.e., a wave of deals.
Proposition 7. In the equilibrium of Proposition 6 when the discount rate of investors
decreases from r(0) to r(1), a wave of deals follows. The average quality of the projects
funded at the moment of transition is strictly higher than the average quality of projects
funded at any other time.
t
1→ 0 0→ 1
1 +G(c1)
1 +G(c0)
Yt = 1 Yt = 0 Yt = 1
Figure 5: Volume of Deals at Time t
When the discount rate decreases, incentives to delay fund-raising disappear for two
reasons. First, conditional on the average quality of projects in the market, valuations are
as high as they are ever going to be. Second, more importantly, higher valuations attract
lower quality projects to the market, thus, in expectation the prices will be decreasing. Strict
preferences of entrepreneurs with good projects for immediate trade together with the market
clearing condition require for pooling valuation to be offered and accepted with probability
1. Accumulation of unfunded projects during periods with high discount rates together with
the previous observation imply that there is going to be an atom of funding (see Figure 5)
when the discount rate falls to r(1).
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The quality of the projects funded at the time of transition to Yt = 1 is equal to the
average quality of unfunded projects a second earlier. Due to illiquidity in state 0, the
average quality of unfunded projects is strictly higher than the quality of projects entering
the market, which, in turn, is higher than the average quality of those being funded. Right
after the transition, the average quality significantly drops, since high valuations and ease
of securing financing attracts lower quality projects to the market.
The economic mechanism underlying the wave of deals in my model is novel and very
different from those previously proposed in the literature. In particular, it leads to different
observable dynamics in the quality of funded projects in hot markets. For example, Pa´stor
and Veronesi (2005) and Bustamante (2012) use the real option framework to explain the
clustering of IPO deals over time. The optimal exercise threshold of a real option is a
decreasing function of project’s quality, thus, an improvement in market conditions triggers
owners of lower quality projects to exercise their options. As a result, Pa´stor and Veronesi
(2005) and Bustamante (2012) predict that the quality of funded projects is the highest in
cold markets and always lower in hot markets. A similar pattern arises from the static adverse
selection model of Yung, C¸olak and Wei (2008). In contrast, the quantity of funded projects
in my model is the highest early in the wave, since the quantity adjustment comes from the
top part of the quality distribution. It is the entrepreneurs with high-quality projects who
partially withdraw from the market in bad times and rush back, generating a wave of deals,
when market conditions improve.
4.2 Average Quality of Funded Projects
This section describes the dynamics of the average quality of funded projects. Proposi-
tion 8 compares the average quality of funded projects in states 0 and 1.
Proposition 8. In the equilibrium of Proposition 6, the average quality of funded projects
in state Yt = 0 is higher than in state Yt = 1 if the corresponding state lasts sufficiently long.
Figure 6 shows the dynamics of the average quality of funded projects over time. In state
Yt = 1 with the low discount rate, funding is raised immediately. Therefore, the average
quality of the projects conditional on receiving financing is fully determined by the quality
of the projects entering the market. High prices and the ease of obtaining funding attracts
a pool of projects of low average quality.
In state Yt = 0, however, projects are financed at both separating and pooling valua-
tions. Conditional on raising funding at the separating valuation, the quality of the project
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1→ 0 0→ 1
α∗1
α∗0
pit
Yt = 1 Yt = 0 Yt = 1
Lemons Problem
Figure 6: Fraction of Good Projects Funded at Time t
is always low while those funded at the pooling valuation are on average of very high qual-
ity. The average quality conditional on getting funded, thus, is a weighted average of a
low (separating) and high (pooling) project quality. The acceptance rate of the separating
valuation is constant over time. At the same time, the acceptance rate of pooling valuation
increases over time due to an accumulation of projects in the market. Thus, the volume-
weighted average quality of funded projects increases over time. It eventually approaches
the steady state quality, which is equal to the quality of the projects entering the market. In
equilibrium, entrepreneurs with bad projects are indifferent between accepting a separating
price and waiting to get a pooling price, thus, W bt = Bb(DX(0)Xb) when Yt = 0. The high
discount rate and lack of overpricing attracts fewer entrepreneurs with bad projects to the
market, resulting in α∗0 > α
∗
1.
4.3 Liquidity and Entry
This section explores welfare properties of the equilibrium with stochastic discount rate.
Proposition 9 discusses two different forces, illiquidity and excessive entry, that impede
efficiency.
Proposition 9. The equilibrium of Proposition 6 is never efficient: when Yt = 0, funds on
average are raised with a positive delay, and when Yt = 1, there is an excessive entry of
entrepreneurs with lower quality projects.
When the discount rate is low (Yt = 1), every entrepreneur entering the market imme-
diately secures funds at pooling valuation. This is not, however, the case in state Yt = 0.
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When the discount rate is high, immediate funding can be secured only at a separating valu-
ation, which is unacceptable for entrepreneurs with good projects, so only a fraction of lower
quality projects is funded at low valuations. The vast majority of the market is attempting
to secure funding at the pooling valuation, which leads to a delay. Since pooling valuation
is offered with intensity λp, the funding rate at this valuation is λp(m
g
t + m
b
t). At the time
of arrival of Yt = 0, both m
g
t and m
b
t are zero, and the inflow rate of new entrepreneurs is
positive. Hence, inventory starts accumulating (see Figure 7).
mgt +m
b
t
t
1→ 0 0→ 10
M
Yt = 1 Yt = 0 Yt = 1
Figure 7: Volume of Unfunded Projects at Time t
ct
t
1→ 0 0→ 1
c1
c0
Yt = 1 Yt = 0 Yt = 1
First Best
Figure 8: Entry Threshold ct
On the other hand, illiquidity in state Yt = 0 allows for the partial screening of projects.
The equilibrium payoff of the entrepreneur entering the market, when discount rate is high, is
exactly Bb(DX(0)Xb; 0). It implies that the NPV of the marginal project entering the market,
taking into account the private cost of entry ci, is zero. Thus, equilibrium entry threshold ct
is at the first best level, as shown in Figure 8. When the state is Yt = 1, equilibrium features
immediate pooling and equilibrium continuation value of an entrepreneur with a bad project
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entering the market is Bb(DX(1)(α
∗
1Xg + (1−α∗1)Xb); 1). In addition to a low discount rate,
owners of lower quality projects enjoy the benefits of overpriced equity. Such an implicit
subsidy distorts incentives to enter the market. Indeed, the NPV of the marginal project
brought to the market in the state with low discount rate is:
Bb(DX(1)Xb; 1)− ct = Bb(DX(1)Xb; 1)−Bb
(
DX(1)(α
∗
1Xg + (1− α∗1)Xb); 1
)
< 0.
Hence, when Yt = 1, the equilibrium is inefficient due to an excessive entry of entrepreneurs
with lower quality projects.
5 Empirical Implications
The results based on the equilibrium of the model naturally lead to several empirical impli-
cations.
Volume of Deals. My model can be used to demonstrate that the volume of deals and
market prices are positively correlated with market conditions. Lower gains from trade
caused by, for example, higher cost of investors’ capital, cause not only the price adjustment
but also a quantity adjustment, because owners of high-quality projects find it optimal to
partially withdraw from the market. This prediction is broadly consistent with the findings
across multiple markets in which adverse selection is an important concern. In the venture
capital industry, fund inflows significantly affect the number of funded ventures. In addition,
Gompers and Lerner (2000) document that fund flows predict valuations of startups. Ax-
elson, Jenkinson, Stro¨mberg and Weisbach (2009) show that cost of debt drives the volume
and valuation levels in private equity buyouts. Similarly, in IPO and merger and acquisition
markets, Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) and Ball, Chiu and Smith (2011) find that
the volume of deals is explained by market conditions. Secondary equity issuances seem
to exhibit a similar pattern: Baker and Wurgler (2002) argue that the timing of market
conditions is an important determinant of firms’ capital structure, while Choe, Masulis and
Nanda (1993) show that firms increase equity offerings (relative to debt offerings) during
periods of economic expansion, consistent with my predictions.
Additionally, my model can be used to generate a wave of deals, which is a definitive
feature of IPO (Ritter and Welch (2002)) and private equity buyout (Kaplan and Stein
(1993)) markets.
27
Quality of Funded Projects. In my model, the quality of funded projects is non-
monotonic with respect to market conditions (and volume of deals). The quality is low
when the discount rates have been low for a prolonged period of time. Conversely, it is
higher when discount rates are high, and it is the highest early in the fund-raising wave.
This implies that the empirically measured quality of funded projects might strongly de-
pend on the definition of hot/cold markets. Nevertheless, this prediction has found support
across several markets. In the context of IPOs, Ritter and Welch (2002) write that “it is
conventional wisdom among both academics and practitioners that the quality of firms going
public deteriorates as a period of high issuing volume progresses.” This is consistent with
my findings and is confirmed by Chang, Kim and Shim (2013), who show that firms issuing
earlier in hot markets are of higher quality than firms issuing later. Similarly, Kaplan and
Stein (1993) document that transactions completed in late 1980’s (following a long period of
cheap access to debt) were of poorer quality: among the largest buyouts roughly every third
resulted in some form of financial distress with every fourth actually defaulting on debt and
filing for Chapter 11. In the context of venture capital funding, Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf
(2013) find that startups raising funds in hot markets are more likely to fail, but conditional
on not failing are more successful. This could be driven by the time-varying quality of funded
projects: in my model, early in the hot markets, the average quality is the highest, then it
deteriorates over time.
Time on the Market. Lastly, my model can be used to demonstrate that fund-raising
takes more time when market conditions are bad. Moreover, startups that delay raising
funds receive a better price and signal that their projects are of higher quality on average.
Empirically, this prediction is harder to test, because the time when entrepreneur or firm
first enters the funding market might not be observable. Thus, one should be careful when
testing this prediction. For younger firms, however, this naturally leads to implications about
a firm’s age at the time of receiving financing. For example, one could test whether the age
of startups raising Series A (first round of VC funding) covaries over time with VC fund
flows. Specifically, whether older startups raising Series A round when VC funding is scarce
are of higher quality and are able to secure better terms.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, I examine the effects of time-varying market conditions and endogenous
entry on equilibrium dynamics of markets with adverse selection. In my leading application,
the early stage financing of high-growth firms, the variation in market conditions is driven
by the availability of VC and angel capital.
I analyze the dynamics of the quality of projects receiving financing, as well as deal
volume and market efficiency. During good times, when the supply of VC capital is high,
entrepreneurs raise funds without delay. At the same time, the average quality of funded
projects is typically low. During bad times, when supply of VC capital is low and the
discount rate of investors is correspondingly high, raising funds takes longer on average, but
the average quality of funded projects is typically high.
Time variation in market conditions creates incentives for entrepreneurs with higher
quality projects to signal their type when the discount rate is high. Signaling takes the form
of delayed fund-raising, which leads to an accumulation of unfunded projects in the market.
Consequently, an improvement in market conditions and deterioration of incentives to signal
quality triggers a wave of fund-raising activity.
I also uncover a previously unnoticed positive side of illiquidity. Delay in bad times,
although wasteful due to the lost time value of positive NPV projects, allows investors to
partially screen entrepreneurs. Equilibrium payoff to entrepreneurs with low-quality projects
reflects the true value of their ideas, providing efficient entry incentives.
My model can be used to generate several empirical predictions that are broadly con-
sistent with findings in early stage financing, IPO, private equity buyout, and secondary
offering markets.
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Appendix
A Price Processes
Fix the probability space (Ω,F , P ). Let the index set be I = (−∞, 1] × R+. Index
i = (x, t) stands for a potential entrepreneur i who comes up with an idea at time t. Let
θi = g if the x coordinate of a potential entrepreneur’s index is positive and θi = b if it is
negative. In addition for potential entrepreneurs with bad ideas put the private cost of entry
ci = G−1(−x). Define mes as an extension of the Lebesgue measure with a sigma algebra
of measurable sets FI such that (I × Ω,FI  F ,mes P ) is a rich Fubini extension of the
usual product space.
Put T = R+ to be the time indexing set. Let V be a real-valued measurable function on
((I × Ω)× T, (FI  F)× BT ) which is a regular version of itself. Existence of such F with
essentially pairwise i.i.d. processes V i for arbitrary distribution of V i is guaranteed by Sun
(2006).
Below I will consider a particular class of processes (V i)i∈I satisfying Assumption 2 that
will be sufficient to consider for this paper.
Definition 4. Let {ξik}∞k=0 be a sequence of independent bounded discrete random variables
with finite support distributed according to (Fξ,k)
∞
k=0 and (tk)
∞
k=0 be an unbounded increasing
sequence of non-negative constants. For each entrepreneur i define (N ij)
n
j=1 – a collection
of independent (and independent from all the ξ’s) time non-homogeneous Poisson processes
with deterministic intensities (λNj(t))
n
j=1. Finally, let (vj(t))
n
j=0 be a set of deterministic
functions of finite variation. Then define V it as
V it =

ξik, if t = tk;∑n
j=1 vk(t)dN
i
j(t)
∏
l 6=j
(1− dN il (t)) +
n∏
j=1
(1− dN ij(t))v0(t), if t 6= tk.
(A.1)
Such class of processes allows investors to play a pure strategy (v0), play mixed strategy
with positive weights of mixing (ξ’s), and play a mixed strategy with positive rates of mixing
(vj for j ≥ 1).
The private offers condition is satisfied since the Poisson processes have deterministic
intensities and ξ’s are independent. The anonymity condition holds by construction due
to independence of distributions Fξ’s, times of mixing tk’s, intensities of mixing λNj ’s, and
offered prices vj’s on the identity of the entrepreneur i.
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B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider any equilibrium and denoteW it continuation value of entrepreneur
i present in the market at time t. Since investors do not observe previous offers and each
entrepreneur is atomistic continuation value does not depend on the private historyHit (value
of offers made before or at time t), it depends only of the type of the project θi and calendar
time t. Thus, any offer v with Bθ(v) above W
θ
t will be accepted by entrepreneur with θ theta
quality project and any valuation v with Bθ(v) below W
θ
t will be rejected.
Proof of Lemma 2 . Recall that continuation value of entrepreneur with good quality project
is given by
W gt = sup
F
E
[
Sg +
∫ ∞
t
e−(ρ+δ)(τ−t)(Bg(Vτ )− Sg)dFτ
∣∣∣ τ > t] . (B.2)
Index i can be omitted since continuation value, expected future valuations and, hence, time
of funding do not depend on the identity of the seller. Denote by F ∗ the cdf corresponding to
the optimal timing of fund-raising by an entrepreneur with a bad project. Then the following
chain of inequalities holds:
Bg(v)−W gt = Bg(v)− sup
F
E
[
Sg +
∫ ∞
t
e−(ρ+δ)(τ−t)(Bg(Vτ )− Sg)dFτ
∣∣∣ τ > t]
≤ Bg(v)− E
[
Sg +
∫ ∞
t
e−(ρ+δ)(τ−t)(Bg(Vτ )− Sg)dF ∗τ
∣∣∣ τ ∗ > t]
= E
[∫ ∞
t
Bg(v)− e−(ρ+δ)(τ−t)Bg(Vτ )− Sg(1− e−(ρ+δ)(τ−t))dF ∗τ
∣∣∣ τ ∗ > t]
=
Xg
Xb
E
[∫ ∞
t
Bb(v)− e−(ρ+δ)(τ−t)Bb(Vτ )− Xb
Xg
Sg(1− e−(ρ+δ)(τ−t))dF ∗τ
∣∣∣ τ ∗ > t]
<
Xg
Xb
E
[∫ ∞
t
Bb(v)− e−(ρ+δ)(τ−t)Bb(Vτ )− Sb(1− e−(ρ+δ)(τ−t))dF ∗τ
∣∣∣ τ ∗ > t]
=
Xg
Xb
(
Bb(v)− E
[∫ ∞
t
e−(ρ+δ)(τ−t)Bb(Vτ ) + Sb(1− e−(ρ+δ)(τ−t))dF ∗τ
∣∣∣ τ ∗ > t])
=
Xg
Xb
(
Bb(v)− sup
F
E
[∫ ∞
t
e−(ρ+δ)(τ−t)Bb(Vτ ) + Sb(1− e−(ρ+δ)(τ−t))dFτ
∣∣∣ τ > t])
=
Xg
Xb
(
Bb(v)−W bt
)
.
The strict inequality follows from Sg/Xg > Sb/Xb while the first inequality follows from the
fact that F ∗ could be a suboptimal strategy for an entrepreneur with a good project.
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Proof of Lemma 3 . Suppose the contrary, i.e. that entrepreneur with good project quality
accepts an offer v with probability less than one. Since W gt > W
b
t all entrepreneurs with bad
projects will accept valuation v.
Zero profit condition implies that
v =
δX
δX + r
E
(
Xθi
∣∣∣V it = v, τ i = t) < δXδX + r (pitXg + (1− pit)Xb) . (B.3)
Inequality above is precisely due to mixing of entrepreneurs with good projects.
Since entrepreneur with good project type is indifferent between accepting and not
W gt = Bg(v) < Bg
(
δX
δX + r
(pitXg + (1− pit)Xb)
)
. (B.4)
Which violates Market Clearing condition.
Proof of Corollary 1 . Easily follows from Lemmas 1-3 and Zero Profit condition.
Proof of Proposition 1 . In the steady state equilibrium average quality of the assets in the
market pit is constant over time, which implies that pit can never be below the proportion of
good project entering the market.
Suppose that pit > pˆi. If it takes time to raise funds at a pooling valuation, then Market
Clearing condition is violated since
W gt < Bg
(
δX
δX + r
(pitXg + (1− pit)Xb)
)
. (B.5)
If there exists a steady state equilibrium with pit > pˆi then it has to feature immediate
acceptance of pooling offer. Since pit ≥ 1/(1 + G(c)) the unique equilibrium with 1/(1 +
G(c)) > pˆi features immediate pooling.
Suppose that pit < pˆi. This implies that entrepreneurs with good projects never invest
prior to information arrival, i.e. W gt = Sg. But
Sg = Bg
(
δX
δX + r
(pˆitXg + (1− pˆit)Xb)
)
< Bg
(
δX
δX + r
(pitXg + (1− pit)Xb)
)
, (B.6)
which violates Market Clearing condition. Thus, pit < pˆi is impossible.
When 1/(1 +G(c)) < pˆi the only possibility for pit is to be equal to pˆi. In order for pit to
stay constant separating offer has to be accepted, hence W bt = Sb. Pooling offers need to be
accepted as well, otherwise pit = 1, thus W
g
t = Bg
(
δX
δX+r
(pˆitXg + (1− pˆit)Xb)
)
.
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In order to keep W gt and W
b
t constant expected time to observing a pooling offer for
individual entrepreneur has to be constant over time, i.e. distribution has to be memoryless.
Exponential distribution is the only one satisfying this condition. Pooling offer arrives with
intensity λp which solves
(ρ+ λp)Bb
(
δX
δX + r
Xb
)
= λpBb
(
δX
δX + r
(pˆitXg + (1− pˆit)Xb)
)
. (B.7)
Continuum of equilibria with 1/(1 + G(c)) = pˆi can be constructed in the following
way: pick any λ > λp and put it to be the intensity of arrival of pooling offer for each
entrepreneur, otherwise only separating offers are made. This price path together with
entrepreneurs accepting offers no worse than the pooling one and entrepreneurs accepting
offers only better than separating ones constitutes an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2 . First notice that Bb(α) is continuous and decreasing in α with
1
1 +G(Bb(0))
> 0
1
1 +G(Bb(1))
< 1, (B.8)
hence there exists a unique α˜ that solves 1/(1 +G(Bb(α))) = α.
If α˜ > pˆi, then α∗ = α˜ and uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed by Proposition 1.
If α˜ < pˆi and 1/(1 + G(Bb(0))) < pˆi, then α
∗ = 1/(1 + G(Bb(0))) and uniqueness of
equilibrium is guaranteed by Proposition 1.
Otherwise α∗ = pˆi. Continuation value of entrepreneurs with low quality assets solves
1
1 +G(W bt )
= pˆi, (B.9)
which pins down the arrival rate of the pooling offer λ:
(λ+ δI + ρ)W
b
t = δIBb(0) + λBb(pˆi). (B.10)
Proof of Proposition 4. With a increase in r the lemons condition threshold pˆi is increasing,
moreover, the whole curve f(pi) = 1
1+G(Bb(pi))
shifts up since for fixed pi Bb(pi) is decreasing
in r.
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Proof of Proposition 5. When I
(
Xg
Xb
− 1
)
< ρ
δρ
(Xg − I) then pˆi that solves (14) is negative
for r = 0, implying that lemons condition is not binding regardless of the market belief.
Proposition 2 ensures that the unique equilibrium in this case is immediate pooling and a
fraction of good projects entering the market α∗r=0 is positive. Put r to be a solution of
pˆi|r=r = α∗|r=0. (B.11)
Then for all r < r lemons condition threshold pˆi|r < pˆi|r=r = α∗|r=0 < α∗|r.
If ρ
δ+ρ
(
δX
δX+ρ
Xg − I
)
< I
(
Xg
Xb
− 1
)
then pˆi|r=ρ ∈ (0, 1). Additionally, the restriction on
G implies that α∗|r=ρ is strictly below pˆi|r=ρ. Define r as a solution to
pˆi|r=r = α∗|r=ρ. (B.12)
Clearly 0 < r < r < ρ and for all r ∈ (r, ρ) the following chain of inequalities holds
α∗|r < α∗|r=ρ = pˆi|r=r < pˆi|r since both α∗ and pˆi are strictly increasing in r.
Proof of Proposition 6 . Assume that in times when Yt = 1 there is immediate acceptance
of the pooling offer, hence, continuation values for entrepreneurs seeking funding is
W gt (1) = Bg
(
DX(1)(α
∗
1Xg + (1− α∗1)Xb)
)
W bt (1) = Bb
(
DX(1)(α
∗
1Xg + (1− α∗1)Xb)
)
.
(B.13)
And suppose that in times Yt = 0 pooling valuation DX(1)(pi
∗Xg + (1− pi∗)Xb) arrives with
intensity λp. Partial pooling outcome implies continuation values are given by
W bt (0) = Bb
(
DX(0)Xg
)
W gt (0) = Bg
(
DX(0)(pi
∗Xg + (1− pi∗)Xb)
)
. (B.14)
I will now prove that for sufficiently small λ1 this can be sustained as an equilibrium. First
define pi∗ as a solution to
(ρ+λ1 + δ)Bg
(
DX(0)(pi
∗Xg + (1−pi∗)Xb)
)
= λ1Bg
(
DX(1)(pi
∗Xg + (1−pi∗)Xb)
)
+ δBg(Vg).
For small λ1 the solution pi∗ is well defined (i.e. it is less than 1), moreover, if λ1 = 0 then
pi∗ = α∗
∣∣∣
r=r(0)
, otherwise pi∗ > α∗
∣∣∣
r=r(0)
. Now, define λp as a solution to
(ρ+λ1+λp)Bb(Vb) = λ
1Bb
(
DX(1)(pi
∗Xg+(1−pi∗)Xb)
)
+λpBb
(
DX(0)(pi
∗Xg+(1−pi∗)Xb)
)
.
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Existence of λp > 0 for small λ
1 is guaranteed by the fact that pˆi|r=r(0) > α∗|r=r(0). These
two equation make sure that in the state Yt = 0 pooling offer is accepted by entrepreneurs
with good and bad projects and entrepreneurs with bad projects are indifferent between
waiting for a pooling valuation (or information revelation) and accepting a separating offer
immediately. Clearly Zero Profit and Market Clearing condition is satisfied in this state.
I now need to make sure that immediate pooling is equilibrium in state Yt = 1, given the
continuation values for state Yt = 0. Since the price of pooling is not moving over time, the
only potentially profitable deviation for entrepreneurs is wait all the way until Yt = 0. This
yields expected payoff
δ
δ + λ0 + ρ
Bg(Vb) +
λ0
δ + λ0 + ρ
W gt (0) and
δ
δ + λ0 + ρ
Bb(Vb) +
λ0
δ + λ0 + ρ
W bt (0)
for the entrepreneurs with good and bad projects respectively. Conjectured W bt (1) is higher
than the pay-off from such deviation since is it higher component-wise. When λ1 = 0 then
W gt (0) simply becomes δ/(δ + ρ)Bg(DX(1)Xg), hence the pay-off to deviation for the owner
of the good project is less than δ/(δ + ρ)Bg(Vg). Since α
∗∣∣
r=r(1)
> pˆi
∣∣
r=r(1)
the following
inequality must hold
W gt (1) = Bg
(
DX(1)(α
∗
1Xg + (1− α∗1)Xb)
)
>
δ
δ + ρ
Bg(DX(1)Xb), (B.15)
implying that W gt (1) is still higher then the pay-off from deviation from sufficiently small λ
1.
Zero Profit and Market Clearing conditions are trivially satisfied in Yt = 1 given the W
θ
t (1).
Proof of Propositions 8, 7, and 9. The entry threshold ct is determined by
ct ≡ c∗1 = Bb
(
DX(1)(α
∗
1Xg + (1− α∗1)Xb)
)
when Yt = 1 (B.16)
and
ct ≡ c∗0 = Bb
(
DX(0)Xb
)
when Yt = 0. (B.17)
Clearly, c∗0 < c
∗
1 since DX(0) < DX(1) and α
∗
1 ∈ (0, 1), implying that quality of entry is worse
in the Yt = 1 state.
When the state lasts for sufficiently long, the the average quality of funded projects
is close to the average quality of projects entering the market, implying the statement of
Proposition 8.
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When Yt = 0 funds are raised at both pooling and separating valuations. Denote by q
0
t
and qpit rates of fund-raising at separating and pooling valuations respectively, then
m˙gt = 1− qpit · pit m˙bt = G(ct)− qpit · (1− pit)− q0t when Yt = 0 (B.18)
Since pit is equal to pi
∗ when Yt = 0, G(ct) − q0t = 1−pitpit . Each entrepreneur i raises funds
at the pooling valuation with intensity λp, thus, the rate of deals at this valuation is q
pi
t =
λp(m
g
t +m
b
t). Plugging the values for q
0
t and q
pi
t reveals that
m˙gt = 1− λpmgt > 0 m˙bt =
1− pi∗
pi∗
− λpmbt > 0 when Yt = 0, (B.19)
implying that there is accumulation of unfunded projects in the market over time. When
discount rate falls back to r(1) immediate pooling implies at atom of deals,
The average quality of projects funded in the atom is pi∗ which is higher than α∗0 by
construction of equilibrium, hence, the statement of Proposition 7 follows.
Proof of Proposition 9 is given in the main text.
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